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NOTE
The First Amendment and Mandatory
Courtroom Closure in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court:

The Press' Right, the Child
Rape Victim's Plight
By Arthur S. Frumkin*

Introduction
When a child is sexually molested or raped by a juvenile, the accused is entitled to certain constitutional and statutory protectionsprotections that are not extended to the victim. As manifested by the
Supreme Court's decision in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,'

the effect of this difference between the enjoyment of rights engenders
anomalous results. The significance of this inequality of rights is the
subject of well documented literature.2 Commentators have stated that
"[t]he court experience, for the rape victim, precipitates as much of a

psychological crisis as the rape itself.' 3 In more metaphorical terms, it
has been suggested that a rape victim may feel as though she has been

raped twice: first by the defendant and then by the criminal justice

system.4 Cognizant of the juvenile rape victim's ordeal, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts sought to enforce greater protections
for the child victim in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (Globe
* A.B., 1980, University of California, Berkeley; member, third year class.
1. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
2. For an examination of the minor rape victim's dilemma, see, e.g., E. HILBERMAU,
THE RAPE VICTIM, chs. 2, 7, 8 (1976); S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE
VICTIM, chs. 12, 14, 15 (1979); J. MACDONALD, RAPE OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 12830 (1971); C. BOHMER, JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS RAPE VICTIMS (1977); and Libai,
The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the CriminalJustice System, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 977 (1969).
3. L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, THE VICTIM OF RAPE 229 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as L. HOLMSTROM]. See also id at chs. 6-8.
4. J. BODE, FIGHTING BACK, ch. 7 (1978); L. HOLMSTROM, supra note 3, at 235-36.
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II).1 But by balancing the public's and the defendant's interests in
open criminal trials against the victim's interest in mitigating his or her
trauma, the United States Supreme Court controverted the conclusions
reached by the Massachusetts court.
This Note contrasts the Supreme Court's holding in Globe News-

paper Co.6 with the decision articulated by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in Globe I. 7 Since both courts predicated their opinions upon the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Richmond
9 these cases are
Newspapers v. Virginia' and Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
also reviewed. It is suggested that in light of the competing interests
and relevant precedents, a more sensible and compelling approach is
presented in both Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion and the
Supreme Judicial Court's opinion. Part I introduces the facts of Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court and follows the case through the first
of two decisions by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
(Globe I). Part II briefly considers the history of the right to public
trials and identifies the victim's and the public's competing interests in
open proceedings; it also addresses the Supreme Court's "presumption
of openness" in criminal trials and the First Amendment right of access
to such hearings as determined in Richmond Newspapers"° and Gannett
Co.I 1 Part III examines the Supreme Judicial Court's application of
RichmondNewspapersto its second decision and discusses the Supreme
Court's subsequent rejection of this application. It further discusses
Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion, which emphatically supports
the Massachusetts court's reasoning as well as its application of Richmond Newspapers. Finally, part IV offers several guidelines that may
aid a trial court in applying the dictates of Globe Newspaper Co.

I.

History of Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court

On April 19, 1979, the Superior Court in the County of Norfolk,
Massachusetts, began hearing preliminary motions in Commonwealth v.
Aladem."2 The indictments alleged the forcible rape of three minor
females. Determining that he was obligated to close the hearings pursuant to a Massachusetts statute, the trial judge instructed that a sign
marked "Closed" be placed on the courtroom door. Court personnel
accordingly prevented the public and press from entering the court5. 383 Mass. 838, 423 N.E.2d 773 (1981).
6. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
7. 383 Mass. 838, 423 N.E.2d 773 (1981).
8. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
9. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
10. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
11. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
12. No. 73102-9 (Norfolk Super. Ct. 1979); see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
379 Mass. 846, 848, 401 N.E.2d 360, 362 (1980) (Globe 1).
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room. 3 The judge interpreted the statute to provide that "a child-victim of an alleged sexual attack is entitled minimally to at least the same
protection that a child-defendant in a case involving sexual matters
has."' 4
Unable to enter the courtroom, counsel for the Globe Newspaper
Co. attempted to file a motion to intervene, but the trial judge refused
to accept the motion. Even though counsel for the defendant objected
to the closure order and the assistant district attorney did not request
the closure, the trial remained closed to press and public. 1' On April
25, 1979, counsel for the Globe petitioned a single justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for a temporary restraining
order and permanent injunction ordering the trial judge to permit
members of the press to attend the trial.' 6 The justice denied the
Globe's petition, and the newspaper appealed to the Supreme Judicial

Court.
On May 10, 1979-while this appeal was pending-the criminal
trial ended in an acquittal. But because the issues raised were "significant and troublesome and. . . capable of repetition yet evading review,"' 7 the Supreme Judicial Court deemed it appropriate to rule on
the appeal. Having resolved alleged ambiguities in the Massachusetts
statute, the court interpreted the Legislature's intent in enacting the
mandatory closure provision in section 16A: "the purpose of [the statute] is to encourage young victims of sexual offenses to come forward;
once they have come forward, the statute is designed to preserve their
ability18to testify by protecting them from undue psychological harm at
trial."'
The Supreme Judicial Court recognized that testifying in public is
an extremely difficult task for a young victim, who may be embarrassed
discussing intimate and disturbing situations in front of strangers.' 9
The court reasoned that since the child-victim is frightened and con13. Id. "At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other
crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the person upon, with or
against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed, . . . the presiding justice shall
exclude the general public from the courtroom, admitting only such persons as may have a
direct interest in the case." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981).
14. Globe I, 379 Mass. at 849, 401 N.E.2d at 363.
15. Id. at 848, 401 N.E.2d at 363.
16. Id. at 847, 401 N.E.2d at 362.
17. Id. at 848, 401 N.E.2d at 362.
18. Id. at 860, 401 N.E.2d at 369. For Massachusetts statutes designed to protect the
identity of juvenile defendants, see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 65 (West 1980)
which excludes the public from juvenile court sessions; MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119,
§ 60A (West 1980), providing that juvenile court records are not open to public inspection;
and MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § IOOB (West 1980), which allows juvenile court
records to be sealed after three years from date of judgment.
19. Globe I, 379 Mass. at 859-60, 401 N.E.2d at 369.
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fused, the child may fear public humiliation and as a result may limit
his or her responses.2 ° The Supreme Judicial Court therefore concluded that the purpose of section 16A is not only to protect juvenile
privacy, but also encompasses Massachusetts' interest "in sound and
orderly administration of justice."'" Because the issue was moot, the
court dismissed the Globe's appeal. The court was careful, however, to
express its fundamental view: "We believe that a policy of admitting
the press during young victims' testimony would substantially increase
the risk that the Commonwealth would lose the benefit of that
testimony."2 2
The Globe then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court vacated the Globe Ijudgment and remanded to the
Massachusetts court for further consideration in light of the Supreme
Court's then recent holding in Richmond Newspapers.23 The Supreme
Judicial Court's consideration of Richmond Newspapers in Globe Ifwill
be examined in part III. Before exploring Globe II, however, it is appropriate first to consider the relevance of Richmond Newspapers and
its not-so-distant cousin, Gannett Co.24
II. The First Amendment Guarantees a Right of Public
Access to Criminal Trials: Gannett Co. v. DePasquale
and Richmond Newspapers v.Virginia
A.

The Public Trial Before Gannett Co. and Richmond Newspapers

L

History of the Public Trial

The tradition of open criminal proceedings is firmly rooted in
common law. It has been stated that one of "the most conspicuous
features of English Justice, that all judicial trials are held in open court,
to which the public have free access. . . appears to have been the rule
in England from time immemorial."2 Indeed, the tradition of open
trials may predate the Norman Conquest, when attendance at trial was
mandatory for freemen.1° It has also been postulated that the public
trial developed as a consequence of the jury system and that attendance
20. Id. at 860, 401 N.E.2d at 369.

21. Id.
22. Id at 864, 401 N.E.2d at 371.
23. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
24. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
25. E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73-74 (6th ed. 1967).

26. For a comprehensive account of the development of the criminal trial in England
and America, see the Chief Justice's opinion in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 565 (citing Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLOAMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 88, 89 (1907)); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 12 (1927); 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 121 (6th ed. 1681); E.
JENKS, supra note 25.
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probably was encouraged on the theory that spectators might contribute evidence.2 7 Still another view maintains that the public trial stems
from a strong fear and distrust of secret trials-in particular the English Court of Star Chamber, the French "lettre de cachet," and the
abuses of the Spanish Inquisition.2 8
In 1670 Hale wrote of the virtues of public trials,2 9 and a century
later Blackstone observed that open trials restrained perjury and minimized judicial prejudice by exposing courtroom behavior to public
view.3" In the early Nineteenth Century Bentham emphasized that
open hearings prevent judicial oppression and promote public confidence in the legal system. Bentham added that open proceedings stimulate judge, jury, and counsel to better performance, protect the judge
from imputations of dishonesty, and educate the public about the
law.3
These progressive ideas culminated in Daubney v. Cooper,3 2 which
established the common law view of public trials in England. In
Daubney, an attorney who was physically ejected from the courtroom
successfully sued the trial judge for assault and battery. Daubney reflects the principle that all interested individuals have a prima facie
right to attend a criminal trial: "one of the essential qualities
of a
' 33
Court of Justice [is] that its proceedings should be public.
The common law tradition of public criminal trials was later
adopted by the American courts. In 1948, the United States Supreme
Court offered its express support to the notion of public trials; the
Court observed that no federal or state court in
this country's history
34
had ever conducted a criminal trial in camera.
2

Conflicting Interests: Protecting the Victims in a Sex Crime Trial and
the Public's Right to Attend the Proceedings

As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts posited in Globe
I, there are distinct interests that compel closure of juvenile sex crime
trials-at least while the minor victim is testifying. Yet, as early as
1897, the Supreme Court of Michigan considered an interest not addressed by the Massachusetts court.35 Believing it necessary to protect
27.
(1915).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
361-66
35.

See F.

MAITLAND

& F.

MONTAGUE,

A

SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY

46

In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-70 (1948).
M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 344-45 (6th ed. 1820).
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 372-73 (1803).
1 J.BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 522-25 (1827).
10 Barn. ch. 237, 109 Eng. Rep. 438 (K.B. 1829).
Id. at 440. The English court apparently cited no authority for this proposition.
Keller, The First Amendment Right ofAccess to Sex Crime Trials, 22 B.C.L. REV.
(1981) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266).
People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 230, 71 N.W. 491, 492 (1897).
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public morality, the Michigan court stated that it would exclude por36
tions of the community from trials that might shock public decency.
However, shielding the public from collective mortification ultimately
diminished in importance 37 as the focus shifted toward protecting the
victim. 38 The Seventh Circuit, explicating this shift, stated that the primary justification for closing a trial during the testimony of a rape victim "lies in the protection of the personal dignity of the complaining
witness."' 39 Several legislatures have accepted this inverted focus and
have promulgated statutes protecting the victim's dignity and integrity.n0 Rather than protecting the public from the victim's testimony,
the courts and legislatures now seek to protect the victim from the
public.
Excluding spectators from a sex crime trial with the aim of protecting a minor victim serves two fundamental interests: it decreases a victim's emotional trauma and furthers the judicial process.4 As
suggested by the court in Globe I, the victim's trial ordeal may be
greatly mitigated by closing the hearing to the public.4 2 The victim's
health and emotional well being will almost certainly be threatened if
he or she is forced to recount the details of the attack before a curious
mass of people.4 3 Psychiatrists agree that the trial can create as much
psychological trauma for a rape victim as the crime itself created' and
that treatment in the period following discovery of a child rape is as
important as treatment at the time of discovery itself.4 5 Thus, any proposal that seeks to mitigate the victim's injury must be accorded careful
consideration.
36. Id.; see also Keller, supra note 34, at 363.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949) ("Whatever may have
been the view of an earlier and more formally modest age, we think that the franker and
more realistic attitude of the present day toward matters of sex precludes a determination
that all members of the public, the mature and experienced, as well as the immature and
impressionable, may reasonably be excluded from the trial of a sexual offence [sic] upon the

ground of public morals.") Id. at 923.
38. See, e.g., the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts' discussion in Globe I, supra

part I.
39. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 1977).
40. See, e.g., the following statutes that allow closure of courtroom proceedings: ALA.
CODE § 12-21-202 (1975); ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 9.3 (1973); GA. CODE § 81-1006 (1956); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:469.1 (West 1981); Miss. CONsT. art. III; N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-166 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-02 (1974);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-4 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1901 (1973); Wis. STAT.
§ 970.03 (4) (Supp. 1981).

41. See Keller, supra note 34, at 364; see also supranotes 22-23 and accompanying text.
42. Globe 1, 379 Mass. at 860, 401 N.E.2d at 369.
43.
COLUM.
44.
45.

See Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
L. REV. 1, 88 (1977).
L. HOLSTROM, supra note 3, at 229.
Libai, The Protectionofthe Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the CriminalJustice

System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 980-81 (1969).

Summer 19841

MANDATORY COURTROOM CLOSURE

Prompting a more effective administration of justice is the second
interest served by protecting a minor victim in a sex crime proceeding.
Assailants often remain at large because victims, fearing humiliation or
embarrassment at trial, choose not to testify. 46 Even if the victim does
elect to testify, a crowded courtroom may deter the child victim from
speaking freely. 47 Without complete testimony, prosecutorial efforts
will be frustrated, and the trial result will be tainted.48 Prohibiting
spectators from attending a sex crime trial involving a minor victim
thus serves two significant interests: the victim's dignity is protectedlimiting the potential for additional anguish-and justice is facilitated
because the victim is more likely to testify candidly.
Just as there are substantial interests dictating closure, there exist
competing interests demanding unrestricted public access.4 9 The public has an interest in maintaining a fair and effective judicial process; its
participation and scrutiny serves "as the ultimate check on a wayward
judicial system."5 In the absence of public inspection, there is a
greater likelihood of prejudiced decisions; 5' as this likelihood increases,
public suspicion rises as well and engenders misunderstanding, apathy,
and hostility toward the entire legal system." But when the courtroom
doors are opened-subjecting police, prosecutors, and judges to public
view-the abuses that stem from closed trials are largely diminished. 3
Under the theory that increased publicity enhances the opportunity to discover false testimony, the courts have suggested that open
trials reduce perjury and curb potentially prejudiced decisions. 4 In
addition, the publicity stemming from an open proceeding may produce relevant evidence from individuals who otherwise would be unaware of the trial.55 Public proceedings may also serve valuable
educational functions, because citizens acquire a better understanding
of the judicial process by attending criminal trials. With this understanding, citizens will develop a greater confidence in and respect for
46. See Berger, supra note 43, at 92.
47. "[A] victim may be less willing to relate certain details of the experience when testifying before extraneous spectators." Keller, supra note 34, at 364.
48. Id
49. See generallyNote, TrialSecrecy and the FirstAmendment Right ofPublic Access to
JudicialProceedings,91 HARV. L. REV. 1899 (1978).
50. Watson, Exclusion of the Pressand the Publicfrom PretrialCriminal Proceedingsto
GuaranteeFairTrial,25 WAYNE L. REV. 883, 891 (1979).
51. Dollinger, PublicAccess to the PretrialCriminalHearings.: The Use of Closure Orders After Gannett v. DePasquale, 44 ALB. L. REV. 455, 481 (1980).
52. Id See generally United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3rd Cir. 1978); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
53. Keller, supra note 34, at 365.
54. See, e.g., Tanksley v. U.S., 145 F.2d 58, 59-60 (9th Cir. 1944).
55. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n.24.
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the law.16 Furthermore, an open trial may serve as an emotional outlet
for individuals shocked by violent crime, "provid[ing] a cathartic sense
that the guilty are ultimately punished."5 7 In tying together the interests advocating open trials, one commentator concludes: "It is only
proper that in a democratic system of government, where the citizens
are ideally the ultimate decision makers, the public trial should be
thought of as a public right."5 8
Thus far it has been shown that a conflict exists between the public's interest in open courtrooms and the victim's interest in closed proceedings. Adding to this conflict are several interests supporting
closure: specifically, interests in "avoiding prejudicial pretrial publicity
and . . . concealing the identity of informants. 59
The United States Supreme Court attempted to resolve some of
these conflicting interests in Gannett Co.6" Conflict and ambiguity,
however, have remained. Aware of the persistent contention, 6the Court
attempted to clarify these interests in Richmond Newspapers. '
B.

The First Amendment and the Public Right of Access to Criminal
Proceedings

1. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale: No Public Access to PretrialCriminal
Hearings
On July 16, 1976, a former policeman and two guests took a boat
out on Lake Seneca, but only the two companions returned. Police
found bullet holes in the boat and dragged the lake for the apparent
victim's body.
During the same period in which the incident occurred, Gannett
Co., Inc. was publishing two newspapers in an area neighboring the
lake. Each newspaper carried eight articles regarding the alleged murder, the arrest of the suspects, and their arraignment on charges of second degree murder and larceny. At the pretrial hearing, counsel for
one of the defendants requested that the public and the press be excluded, since counsel feared that the publicity had jeopardized his client's opportunity for a fair trial. The court decided to exclude the
public and the press and predicated its decision on a "reasonable
probability of prejudice to [the] defendant. ' 62 The New York Supreme
56. See generallyRichmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Keller, supra
note 34, at 365.
57. Keller, supra note 34, at 366.
58. Watson, supra note 50, at 892.
59. Keller, supra note 34, at 366.
60. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
61. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
62. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d

756, 759 (1977).

Summer 1984]

MANDATORY COURTROOM CLOSURE

Court vacated the order, concluding that the exclusion constituted a
prior restraint and ran contrary to public interest in open judicial proceedings.6 3 Reinstating the trial court's decision, the New York Court
of Appeals reversed the New York Supreme Court on the ground that
when pubevidentiary hearings are presumptively closed to the public
64
licity may threaten the impanelling of an impartial jury.
Even though each member of the United States Supreme Court
agreed that the public has a definitive interest in open trials,6 5 Justice
Stewart's plurality opinion in Gannett Co. stated that the actual right to
a public trial is solely personal to the accused under the Sixth Amendment, and society's interests in an open trial are necessarily
subordinated to the trial judge's finding that closure is required to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.6 6 The Court stated that under
common law the public had no established right to attend pretrial proceedings and that, at the very least, these proceedings were rarely characterized by the same degree of openness as were actual trials. In
support of its position, the Court cited the New York Field Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1850 and several other statutes, all of which provided for closed pretrial proceedings. 67 The Court thus concluded that
it is only the defendant who has an enforceable right to a public trial
under the Sixth Amendment.
It should be noted that Justice Powell was the only member of the
Court to recognize a First Amendment right of access. He maintained
that the press, as an agent of the public, has a First Amendment right to
be present at the hearing.68 Nevertheless, in concurring with the plurality, Justice Powell indicated that the right of access is not absolute
but is limited by the defendant's right to a fair proceeding. 69 By contrast, Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, declined to address
the First Amendment. He found that the public and press do have a
right of access; however, he attributed the right to the Sixth Amendment. Justice Blackmun argued that the Sixth Amendment prevents
exclusion of the public and press from both pretrial and trial proceedings without full consideration of the public interest in a public
63. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 54 A.D.2d 1133, 389 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1976).
64. For a general review of the sequence of events, see Reznek, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale and Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia: Re-opening Courtroom Doors and Constitutional Windows, 10 CAP. U.L. REv. 101, 107-08 (1980).
65. Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 383 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
66. Id. at 381.
67. Id. at 390-91. The Court cited the following codes in footnote 23: ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. 9.3 (1973); CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE § 19-811 (1979); IowA
CODE § 761.13 (1973); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-10-201 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.204
(1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29.07-14 (1974); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-13 (1978).
68. Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 397-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
69. Id.
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proceeding.7 °
Gannett Co. 's scope quickly became the subject of considerable
confusion among journalists and commentators.71 The plurality72 expressly stated that under the Sixth Amendment, the right to a public
trial applies exclusively to the defendant.7 3 The dissenting opinion expressly stated that under the Sixth Amendment, the right to a public
trial applies to the public and press as well as to the defendant. 74 Jus-

tice Powell recognized the public's First Amendment right of access,
yet he ruled in favor of the defendant's right to close the proceeding.
And the Chief Justice, who explicitly stated that, in his view, the decision applied only to pretrial hearings, nevertheless joined the plurality
opinion-an opinion which "[n]o less than 12 times.

. .

observed that

the Sixth Amendment closure ruling applied to the trial itself."75 Thus,
the principle that trials as well as pretrial proceedings may be closed
only succeeded in mustering plurality support.7 6
The ambiguity of Gannett Co. was indicated by the fact that several of the participating Justices still did not agree on just what the
Court had decided.77 As a result of this equivocal ruling, the lower
courts began closing a significant number of trials as well as pretrial
proceedings. In response to this growing "rash of closure orders,"78
the Supreme Court once again found it necessary to step into the ring
and wrestle with the question of public right of access to judicial
proceedings.
2. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia: The FirstAmendment Right of
Access Presumes Open Doors

John Paul Stevenson was convicted of murder. The conviction,
however, was overturned because a jacket had been improperly admitted into evidence. Stevenson's second trial ended in a mistrial due to a
juror's illness; his third trial also ended in a mistrial because a juror
was influenced by publicity relating to the case. At the outset of the
fourth trial, the defendant's attorney moved to exclude the press and
public from the proceedings. After the trial judge granted the motion,
two newspaper reporters who were barred from the courtroom moved
70. Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Dollinger, supra note 51, at 472.
71. Copple, Public Trials and a First Amendment Right of Access: A Presumption of
Openness, 60 NEB. L. REv. 169, 185 (1981).

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, Stevens and Chief Justice Burger formed the plurality.
Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 381 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Reznek, supra note 64, at 113.

77. See Copple, supra note 71, at 185 (citing THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Nov.-Dec.

1979, at 5).
78. Copple, supra note 71, at 185.
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for the trial to be reopened.7 9 The judge denied the reporters' motion
and emphasized that he was absolutely committed to resolving the case
since this was the defendant's fourth trial.8" Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. sought writs of prohibition and mandamus; the writs were denied
by the Virginia Supreme Court, which cited Gannett Co. as its sole authority.8 Ironically, after a two-day trial, the defendant was acquitted.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
It was widely anticipated that the Supreme Court's decision in
Richmond Newspapers would clarify Gannett Co.82 In its decision reversing the Virginia court, the Supreme Court for the first time recognized that the First Amendment does support a public right of access to
criminal trials.8 3 This recognition established that the public has a
right, similar to that of the accused, to object to the closure of a criminal trial on constitutional grounds.84 Thus, when an individual "moves
to compel access to a sex crime trial, courts must balance his First
Amendment right recognized'85in Richmond Newspapersagainst the state
interest in closing the trial.
In contrast with the motley opinions in Gannett Co., the Supreme
Court presented a relatively united front in Richmond Newspapers.86
The apparent unity87 may be due, in part, to the Court's treatment of
Gannett Co., which was accorded virtually no precedential value.8 8 The
Court was united, however, only in its recognition of the public's First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials; aside from that basic acknowledgment, the Court failed to agree on the applicable First
Amendment foundation.8 9 The concurring opinions of Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens recognized the open trial right as an unprecedented First Amendment right of access to important
79. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 560.
80. For a general chronicling of the procedural events, see Reznek, supra note 64, at
118-19.
81. Id. at 119.
82. Id. at 118.
83. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570. Justice Stevens stated that it is this First
Amendment right of access that makes Richmond Newspapersa "watershed case." Id. at 571
(Stevens, J., concurring).
84. Keller, supra note 34, at 362.
85. Id
86. For an illustrative analysis of the Justices' opinions, see Keller, supra note 34, at
372-75.
87. Reznek, supra note 64, at 128.
88. Id. at 123.
89. Of the eight Justices participating in the decision, seven found that the First
Amendment granted the public a right of access to criminal trials. Justice Rehnquist, the
sole dissenter, maintained that there is no constitutional right of public access. See Keller,
supra note 34, at 372.
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information.9" The plurality opinion of the Chief Justice, as well as
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, maintained that the right to attend criminal trials is primarily ensured by the First Amendment right
of assembly.9 1
The opinions of Justices Brennan, Stevens, and Blackmun embraced First Amendment rights to gather information. In a detailed
opinion, Justice Brennan suggested that the First Amendment has a
"structured role to play" in securing and maintaining a republican system of self-government. 92 He emphasized that the structural protections of the First Amendment shield expression and ensure informed
debate when important public questions are at issue. Thus, under Justice Brennan's model of the First Amendment's right of access, "both
wide open debate and the processes by which information is gathered
to fuel the debate" 93 are protected. Underlying these "structural protections" is the hope that "freedom of access to criminal trials and the
resulting dissemination of trial information will inform the public and
'94
serve to alleviate many fair trial concerns.
In contrast, the Chief Justice's plurality opinion determined that
the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of assembly protects the
right to attend criminal trials. 95 The Chief Justice, equating courtrooms with streets, parks, and other places usually open to the public,
submitted that the right of access to a courtroom is tantamount to the
right of peaceable assembly in other public places.9 6 Agreeing with the
Chief Justice, Justice Stewart suggested that in light of the crucial role
the public plays in criminal proceedings, the right of assembly is even
more important in a courtroom than it is in such places as streets and
97
parks.
More significant than the differing characterizations of the First
Amendment right of access was the Justices' inability to agree on the
extent of the open trial right. All agreed that the public right of access
is not absolute; as one commentator observed: "After the existence of
the right had been denied for so long, the Richmond Newspapers Court
was not about to turn around and recognize a broad right which would
subject all governmental institutions and information to public ac90. Id.; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 572
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 582 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
91. Keller, supra note 34, at 372; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569; id. at 581
(Stewart, J., concurring).
92. Richmond Newspapers,448 U.S. at 574 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring). See Keller, supra note 34, at 373.
93. Copple, supra note 71, at 192.
94. Keller, supra note 34, at 373.
95. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569.
96. See Keller, supra note 34, at 374.
97. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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cess." 98 Short of this extreme, however, the Court was unable to present a definitive and unified approach for determining when closure
may be justified.
The Chief Justice suggested that an overriding interest must be
evidenced in order to warrant closing a trial. 99 He stated that ensuring
a "quiet and orderly setting" or preventing overcrowded courtrooms
may be instances justifying closure."I He cautioned, however, that a
trial judge may impose these limitations only "so as not to deny...
opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of
public questions immemorially associated with resort to public
places."' 0 '
Justice Brennan stated that he would weigh the "structural interest" in gathering information against closure by considering "the information sought and the opposing interests invaded."' 0 2 Unfortunately,
he failed to disclose the countervailing interests that might
be suffi03
ciently compelling to reverse the presumption of openness.
Justice Stewart was scarcely more specific. Recognizing that there
are interests sufficient to overcome the presumption of openness, he determined that the defendant's right to a fair trial was the most compelling."° He did observe, however, that protecting the sensibilities of a
juvenile prosecution witness in a rape trial may warrant closure in and
of itself.0 5
The Supreme Court's decision in Richmond Newspapers clearly
recognized the public's First Amendment right of access to criminal
trials. But because the decision did not establish unified and specific
guidelines 0 6 by which to balance competing interests, "trial judges can
be expected to have great difficulty in translating the various proposed
standards into concrete tests with which to rule on closure motions."'0 7
Justice Blackmun may have put it best when he contemplated the va98. Copple, supra note 71, at 198.
99. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 581 n.18 (citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941)).
102. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575 (Brennen, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 580. See Keller, supra note 34, at 375.
104. Richmond Newspapers,448 U.S. at 598 (Stewart, J., concurring).
105. Id at 600 n.5. It is worth noting that Justice Stewart refers to youthful prosecution
witnesses in juvenile sex crime trials. The implication seems to be that the word "witness"
includes, but is not limited to, the victim herself.
106. Because the trial court in Richmond Newspapers made no findings to support its
closure order, and because it failed to inquire whether alternative solutions would have provided the defendant with a fair trial, the Supreme Court was not presented with any interest
to balance against the First Amendment rights of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. It has been
suggested that the Supreme Court never had an opportunity "to refine a standard by which
to conduct such balancing." Keller, supra note 34, at 374 n.124.
107. Id. at 375.
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ried approaches displayed by the Court: "uncertainty marks the na'
ture-and strictness--of the standard of closure the Court adopts."108
To appreciate more fully the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in
Globe I, it may prove useful to retrace briefly the pertinent competing
interests in light of the opinions expressed in Gannett Co. and Richmond Newspapers. Open trials tend to ensure a just and effective judicial process because (1) the public is able to scrutinize proceedings; (2)
suspicions and hostilities are dissipated; and (3) through education and
understanding, the public may learn to appreciate--or, at a minimum
respect--our system. In contrast, closing the courtroom under particular circumstances also ensures a just and effective judicial process.
Closing a proceeding to exclude spectators necessarily decreases a rape
victim's emotional trauma, which in turn enhances the legal process:
when the victim is less fearful and intimidated, his or her testimony is
more effective and complete.
I In balancing the competing interests in view of the Supreme
Court's decision in Gannett Co., it appears that a minor sex crime victim's interests are arguably substantial enough to tip the scale for closure-at least in pretrial situations. °9 Although this rationale
supporting pretrial closure in Gannett Co. was ambiguous, the trend of
post-Gannett Co. decisions favors closure. Thus, when competing interests are fairly well balanced, the presence of a minor victim may well
be a decisive factor. But in weighing these interests in light of Richmond Newspapers, the scale is more difficult to gauge. While the
Supreme Court recognized the public's First Amendment right of access, it was careful to emphasize that this right is not absolute. Furthermore, no Justice was willing to establish definitive standards indicating
when closure may be appropriate. Justice Stewart, in his concurring
opinion, did suggest that closure may be justified when the sensibilities
of a youthful witness warrant protection." 0 In considering this statement and the Court's recognition that the right of access is limited,
along with the Supreme Court's failure to overturn Gannett Co., it
seems reasonable to perceive the scale tipping in favor of the minor sex
crime victim's protection.
In Globe II, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts interpreted the Richmond Newspapers decision to comport with the minor
victim's interest in protection-even if the protection constituted
mandatory closure. The Supreme Court disagreed.
108.
109.
turned
110.

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
It is worth noting again that no case, including Richmond Newspapers, has overGannett Co.
See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 599.
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III. Globe Revisited in Light of Riehmond Newspapers
A. The Supreme Judicial Court: Round Two
When the United States Supreme Court remanded Globe Ito the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the Massachusetts court reaffirmed its initial interpretation of section 16A, the statute at issue.
The court stated that the statute mandates closure only during the period in which the minor witness testifies"' and that, in determining
whether closure is necessary, the trial judge must carefully consider
"the State's interest in preserving evidence and obtaining just convictions." 12 It further emphasized that before granting closure the trial
judge must first conduct a hearing at which any individual who may be
excluded can argue against closure' 3 -this includes representatives of
the press. The court then acknowledged the First Amendment right of
public access to criminal trials established in Richmond Newspapers,
but nevertheless concluded that section 16A, "as construed in Globe ,
is constitutional under the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution."' 14 Finally, the Supreme Judicial Court noted the challenge in
attempting to glean the applicable legal standard from Richmond Newspapers since the opinions in that case offer differing approaches:
"There is some difficulty in determining the binding rule of law in a
decision which lacks reasoning to which a majority of the Court has
agreed."'1 5 The court observed that "[t]here is also little direction
about the level of opposing interests necessary to exclude the press and
public."' 16 With these legal obstacles in view, the Massachusetts court
analyzed the mandatory closure requirement of section 16A in relation
to the evasive standard of Richmond Newspapers.
In its analysis the Supreme Judicial Court established a threefold
inquiry: (1) Does the closing of the courtroom during the minor rape
victim's testimony violate the tradition of open proceedings recognized
in Richmond Newspapers; (2) to what degree does the restriction thwart
the flow of communication necessary to the functioning of democratic
institutions; and (3) are there significant state interests embodied in the
statute, and if so, can they be furthered by alternative regulations
which are less intrusive on the press and public interests?" 7
In its first inquiry, the court reiterated its findings in Globe I It
noted that the constitutional right of access to proceedings stems, in
111. Globe I1, 383 Mass. at 840, 423 N.E.2d at 775. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
112. Globe II, 383 Mass. at 840, 423 N.E.2d at 775.
113. Id.
114. Id at 839, 423 N.E.2d at 774.
115. Id at 843, 423 N.E.2d at 776 n.8.
116. Id at 844, 423 N.E.2d at 777.
117. Id at 845, 423 N.E.2d at 778.
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part, from "an unbroken tradition of openness." ' 1 8 However, the court
recognized one important exception to this tradition: "In cases involving sexual assaults, portions of trials have been closed to some segments of the public, even where the victim was an adult." '" 9 The court
stated that, historically, sexual assault proceedings have been recognized as involving substantial interests of the victim and that these interests may "outweigh the public's right to unfettered access to the
trial."' 2 ° In support of this view, the court referred to authority in
other jurisdictions that permits closure in sexual assault trials. 2 ' The
court cited several cases,' 2 2 including Gannett Co., and stated: "it is
clear that the majority of the courts have upheld decisions to close parts
of trials when a minor victim of a sexual assault is testifying."' 2 3 The
Supreme Judicial Court additionally noted that in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Stewart explicitly stated that closure may be justified in a
situation where the "sensibilities of a youthful prosecution witness" in
a rape case are at stake.' 24 Thus, the Massachusetts court concluded
that closing the proceeding while the minor victim testifies does not
violate the tradition of open proceedings because closure in this situation is an historical exception to that tradition.
Addressing the second of the three inquiries, the court determined
that section 16A only minimally restricts the flow of information necessary to the functioning of democratic institutions. The court observed
that trials are not automatically closed when the victim testifying is an
adult. Thus, the public will generally be able to scrutinize the judicial
process in proceedings relating to sexual assault. 25
In its third and final inquiry, the Supreme Judicial Court found
that the state of Massachusetts' interests embodied in the statute were
substantial and genuine. Since Globe Newspaper Co. did not dispute
this, the court merely restated the state's interests identified in Globe I:
(a) to encourage minor victims to come forward to institute complaints and give testimony; (b) to protect minor victims of certain
sex crimes from public degradation, humiliation, demoralization,
and psychological damage; (c) to enhance the likelihood of credible testimony from such minors, free of confusion, fright, or
118. Id (citing Globe I, 379 Mass. 846, 401 N.E.2d 360 (1980)). See also supra notes 49-

58 and
119.
120.
121.

accompanying text.
Globe I1, 383 Mass. at 846, 423 N.E.2d at 778.
Id at 847, 423 N.E.2d at 778-79 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 847 n.12, 423 N.E.2d at 779 n.12. The court cited ALA. CODE § 12-21-202

(1975); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-166 (1975).
122. Several of these cases will be considered in the Chief Justice's dissent in the
Supreme Court's decision in Globe NewspaperCo. See infra notes 158-76 and accompanying

text.
123. Globe II, 383 Mass. at 847, 423 N.E.2d at 779.

124. Id. at 845, 423 N.E.2d at 777 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 600).
125. Id at 847, 423 N.E.2d at 779.
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embellishment; (d) to promote the sound and orderly administration of justice;
26 (e) and to preserve evidence and obtain just
convictions. 1
After establishing that the state's interests were substantial, the
court considered whether a narrower regulation requiring case-by-case
analysis would function as well as the mandatory closure provision of
section 16A. The Massachusetts court recognized that a case-by-case
analysis is less intrusive on the public's First Amendment right of access. Nevertheless, it concluded that such an approach would defeat
the statute's primary purpose. 127 The court first observed that, as a coordinate branch of the government, the Massachusetts Legislature is
empowered to enact statutes providing for the protection of important
state interests and that, "by their very nature, these substantial state
interests would be defeated if a case-by-case determination were
used."' l2 8 Such a determination, argued the court, would require trial
courts to appraise the individual victim's susceptibility, a process likely
to require detailed expert testimony. Moreover, such prognostication
would be dependent upon the expert's ability 2to9 distinguish between
normal reluctance and particular vulnerability.
The Supreme Judicial Court further reasoned that if hearings involving such probing psychological examinations were required, the
victim would be forced to relive the encounter. In addition, allowing
the press to participate and present evidence at the hearing 3 ° would
thrust the victim into the middle of conflicting psychiatric testimony
including, perhaps, examination and cross-examination. Subjecting
the victim to such a trial-within-a-trial, observed the court, would be
unconscionable: "We can perceive of no procedure more damaging to
the well-being of the child; nor one better designed to inhibit criminal
complaints and convictions in such cases."' 3 ' The court also noted that
families of minor victims would languish in uncertainty; they would
not know whether disclosure of the sexual assault resulting from the
open preliminary hearing, as well as from testifying
in front of specta32
tors at trial, would expose the child to trauma.
In concluding its analysis, the Massachusetts court observed that
in both the juvenile justice system and in the state's involvement with
neglected or abused children, there is a clear recognition that Massa126. Id. at 848, 423 N.E.2d at 779.
127. Id.
128. Id
129. Id. at 849, 423 N.E.2d at 780.
130. Id. at 849 n.5, 423 N.E.2d at 780 n.5. At oral argument, Globe Newspaper Co.
suggested a case-by-case approach in determining the victim's psychological condition warranted press participation.
131. Id
132. Id. at 849, 423 N.E.2d at 780.
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chusetts may act in a fashion "that otherwise would be forbidden because of a special solicitousness for the interests of minors."1 33 The
court reasoned that since there is no authority prohibiting a state from
closing juvenile delinquency proceedings in order to protect the juvenile offender from deleterious publicity,134 section 16A must in fairness
be interpreted in the same context. "It would be anomalous indeed,"
stated the court, "if a State Legislature could protect juvenile offenders
by closed hearings but was deemed to lack the power to protect juvenile victims of crime. We do not believe that Richmond Newspapers
dictates such an anomalous result."'' 35 Both "precedent and empirical
research," concluded the court, substantiated Massachusetts' position
that protecting a vulnerable group of individuals is a "genuine and
well-founded" concern:
Logic and history indicate that the method chosen by the State
will further this goal, while making increased reporting of sexual
Although there is some temporary
assaults more likely . .
diminution of information, we cannot say that Richmond Newspapers requires the invalidation of the requirement, given the
in an area of traditional sensitivity to the
statute's narrow scope
36
needs of victims.
Although the Massachusetts court could not say that Richmond Newspapers required the invalidation of the closure provisions of section
16A, the United States Supreme Court found that the statute's scope
was too broad to fit within the confines of Richmond Newspapers.
B. The Supreme Court: The First Amendment in Light of Richmond
Newspapers Dictates a Case-by-Case Analysis
Delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper
Co., Justice Brennan initially reviewed the decision in Richmond Newspapers.I37 He indicated that the underlying purpose of the First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials is to ensure that the "pro133. Id at 850, 423 N.E.2d at 781.
134. For the reasons why a juvenile court proceeding is not considered a public trial, see
Cohen, Reconciling Media Access with Confldentialityfor the Individualin Juvenile Court, 20
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 405 (1980).
135. Globe 1, 383 Mass. at 851, 423 N.E.2d at 781.
136. Id.
137. Justice Brennan recognized at the outset that jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated
when the order attacked has expired if the underlying dispute between the parties is one
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S.
can
498, 515 (1971). The Court determined that the controversy was not moot because "[i]t
reasonably be assumed that Globe, as the publisher of a newspaper serving the Boston metropolitan area, will someday be subjected to another order relying on § 16A's mandatory
closure rule.... And because criminal trials are typically of short duration" such an
order may very likely evade review. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 602-04.
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tected discussion of governmental affairs is an informed one."' 3 8 Justice Brennan gleaned two applicable points from Richmond
Newspapers: (1) the right of access to criminal trials plays an important
part in the functioning of the judicial process and government as a
whole and (2) historically the criminal trial has been open to the press
and general public.'3 9 In pursuing the first point, he reiterated several
benefits derived from public scrutiny. By allowing public 'observation
of criminal trials, the quality and integrity of the judicial process is
enhanced; the appearance of fairness is fostered; a respect for the fact
finding process is increased; and the system as a whole is checked and
thereby limited to its proper functions. 4 0
Considering the second point, Justice Brennan adamantly main' 14 1
tained that "the presumption of openness has remained secure."
Recognition that criminal trials have not always remained open to the
press and public during testimony by juvenile sex victims was relegated
to a footnote. Justice Brennan found this exception to the presumption
of openness "unavailing," as he stated: "In Richmond Newspapers, the
Court discerned a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials
based in part on the recognition that as a generalmatter criminal trials
have long been presumptively open."' 42 Justice Brennan also noted
that whether the First Amendment right of access may be restricted in
the context of a rape trial "depends not on the historical openness of
that type of criminal trial,1 but
rather on the state interests assertedly
43
supporting the restriction."
Recognizing that some state interests may warrant closure, Justice
Brennan cautioned that "the State's justification in denying access must
be a weighty one. . . . It must be shown that the denial is necessitated
by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.'" As Justice Brennan set out to find a narrowly
tailored compelling governmental interest, he reduced Massachusetts'
interest to two elements: protecting the minor victim from further
trauma and encouraging him or her to come forward and testify in a
credible manner. 141 Justice Brennan
applied the remainder of his anal14 6
ysis to these two interests only.
138. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604-05.
139. Id at 605-06.
140. Id. at 606.
141. Id at 605.
142. Id. at 605 n.13 (emphasis added).
143. Id
144. Id. at 606.
145. Id. at 607.
146. Without explanation, Justice Brennan declined to recognize two other interests articulated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: to promote the sound and orderly administration of justice and to preserve evidence and obtain just convictions. 379
Mass. at 860, 865, 401 N.E.2d at 369, 372. It is unclear whether it must be inferred that
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Addressing the first interest, Justice Brennan agreed that the minor's physical and psychological well being is a compelling interest.
However compelling an interest this may be, the Justice nonetheless
reasoned that a mandatory closure rule cannot be justified, "for it is
clear that the circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of the interest."' 4 v A case-by-case basis, he continued, is better
suited to determination of the necessity of closure. With the welfare of
the minor victim in mind, the trial judge must consider "the minor victim's age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the
crime, the desires of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives."' 48 Implicit here is Justice Brennan's concern that the victim's
attempt to express to the public "precisely what a heinous crime the
defendant had committed"' 49 would be thwarted by the mandatory closure provision of section 16A.
The likelihood that a victim would be so deterred, however, seems
remote. As the Massachusetts court stated: "Only the most exceptional
minor would be sanguine about the possibility that the details of an
attack may become public."' 50 Furthermore, in those rare situations
where the victim might desire publicity, he or she remains free to approach both media and public once he or she is outside the courtroom.
It is worth noting that, in supporting a case-by-case basis rather
than mandatory closure, Justice Brennan failed to address the Supreme
Judicial Court's concern relating to the ramifications of a trial-withina-trial: (1) that the difficulty in determining each victim's susceptibility
would be great; (2) that the victim could be forced to relive the traumatic experience; and (3) that families would be subjected to painful
uncertainty due to additional trauma possibly resulting from an open
pretrial proceeding.' 5 ' Justice Brennan merely noted that a trial judge
may have the discretion to prevent newspaper reporters from confronting or cross-examining the victim.'52 Thus, he concluded that the
Massachusetts statute could not be accepted as a narrowly tailored
means of accommodating the State's asserted interest, which "could be
served just as well by requiring the trial court to determine on a caseconcern for the well being
by-case basis whether the State's legitimate
' 53
of the minor victim necessitates closure."'
Justice Brennan found these last two interests unworthy of consideration or whether he believed that they were somehow inextricably associated with the two interests recognized, and
were thus undeserving of separate examination. See supranote 126 and accompanying text.
147. 457 U.S. at 608.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 608 n.21.
150. Globe II, 383 Mass. at 848-49, 423 N.E.2d at 780.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 128-32.
152. 457 U.S. at 609 n.25.
153. Id. at 609.
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In examining Massachusetts' second interest--encouraging victims
to come forward and testify in a credible manner-Justice Brennan
also found section 16A to be untenable. He argued that Massachusetts

offered no empirical evidence supporting its claim that the statute
would lead to an increase in the number of victims coming forward:

without this empirical support "showing that closure would improve
the quality of testimony of all minor sex victims, the state's interest
'
certainly cannot justify a mandatory closure rule."154
Justice Brennan

further suggested that Massachusetts' claim was not only speculative,

but contravened logic and common sense as well. 55 Since the press is
not denied access to either court transcripts or personnel, Brennan reasoned that section 16A cannot prohibit the press from publicizing the
child victim's testimony or identity: "If the Commonwealth's interest

in encouraging minor victims to come forward depends on keeping
such matters secret,
section 16A hardly advances that interest in an ef'56
fective manner."'
Thus, the Supreme Court determined that section 16A violated the
First Amendment to the Constitution since Massachusetts' interests
were neither sufficiently tailored nor sufficiently compelling.'5 7
C. The Dissent
The Chief Justice dissented and was joined by Justice Rehn-

quist.' 58 He began his analysis by disagreeing with the Court's "expansive interpretation" of RichmondNewspapers and its "cavalier rejection

of the serious interests supporting Massachusetts' mandatory closure
rule.""'5 9 The Chief Justice, echoing sentiments of the Supreme Judicial
Court, first submitted that society has historically gone to great pains to
protect minors chargedwith crimes. He noted that releasing the identity of the offender is prohibited, that the press and public are barred
154. Id. at 609-10 n.26.
155. Id at 609-10.
156. Id. Justice Brennan's interpretation of the purpose of § 16A is questionable. Massachusetts did not attempt to encourage the child victim to come forward by means of assured secrecy; rather, it sought to protect the minor victim from additional trauma, once he
or she arrived in the courtroom. To that end, spectators and reporters were to be excluded
in order that the victim might feel less intimidated. With the assurance that the courtroom
experience would be as untraumatic as possible, the state hoped that more victims would be
willing to testify. It is therefore not secrecy after the trial which was sought but rather the
victim's emotional well being at the time of the trial. Thus, the fact that the press was not
denied access to the transcript, and might publicize the victim's testimony, does not render
Massachusetts' claim illogical. For although the victim's words could ultimately be disseminated, the assurance that the more immediate ordeal would remain private may be compelling enough to encourage the victim to come forward.
157. 457 U.S. at 610-I1. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
158. 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (Burger, C.J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
159. Id at 613.

658

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 11:637

from juvenile proceedings, and that the records of such proceedings are
sealed. 160 Chief Justice Burger contended that by finding the Massachusetts statute in violation of the First Amendment the majority advanced an unsettling paradox.
Although states are permitted . . . to mandate the closure of all
proceedings in order to protect a 17-year-old charged with rape,
they are not permitted to require the closing of part of criminal
proceedings in order to protect an innocent
child who has been
16 1
raped or otherwise sexually abused.
The Chief Justice then considered the "presumption of openness"
in criminal trials and concluded that "[ilt would misrepresent the historical record to state that there is an 'unbroken, uncontradicted history' of open proceedings in cases involving the sexual abuse of
minors."' 62
Citing several pertinent decisions in support of this
view, 163 the Chief Justice argued that Justice
Brennan had simply ig64
nored the weight of historical practice.
The Chief Justice recognized that, before closure may be granted,
it must be shown that a "compelling governmental interest" is at stake
and that the closure is "narrowly tailored to serve that interest."' 6 5 He
objected, however, to the majority's "wooden application of the rigid
standard it asserts, ' 166 because it was inapplicable to the case at hand.
The Chief Justice explained that Massachusetts had in no way denied
public or media access to trial information. The trial transcript-as
160. Id. at 612.
161. Id. at 614.
162. Id (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573).
163. See Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964
(1967), where the court observed that closing the courtroom during the testimony of a rape
victim is a frequent and accepted practice; Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488, 490 (9th Cir.
1913), where the court emphasized that a rape victim should not be forced to testify in front
of "a crowd of idle, gaping loafers, whose morbid curiosity would lead them to attend such a
trial"; United States v. Greise, 158 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Alaska 1958), af7'd,262 F.2d 151
(9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959), where the court stated that a trial judge
may exclude members of the public in a criminal trial, "in order to protect a witness from
embarrassment by reason of having to testify to delicate or revolting facts, as a child... ";
Hogan v. State, 86 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Ark. 1935), where the court permitted closure when it
was apparent that the victim was "terribly frightened and embarrassed to have to go upon
the witness stand in the presence of a courtroom crowded with people ..
"; State v. Purvis, 157 Conn. 198, 207, 251 A.2d 178, 182 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969), where
the court concluded that the "temporary and limited exclusion of the general public," during
the minor's testimony was permissible; and finally, Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648 (1921), appeal dismissed,260 U.S. 702 (1922), where the court observed that when it appears to the
court that the victim, "on account of her youth and highly nervous condition, is unable to
give her testimony before a crowd of spectators . . . the trial judge may clear the
courtroom."
164. 457 U.S. at 612, 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 615.
166. Id.
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well as other sources concerning the victim's testimony-was clearly
available to the public and press.' 67 Thus, the Chief Justice maintained
that the pertinent controversy was between "the interests of the media
for instant access against the interest of the state 'in6 8 protecting child
rape victims from the trauma of public testimony."'
Since press and public had complete access to the victim's testimony, the Chief Justice argued, the additional interest of being present
during actual testimony was minimal.' 69 By contrast, Massachusetts'
interest in protecting rape victims from severe psychological harm was
an interest the majority itself was willing to recognize as compelling.
Since the law "need not be precisely tailored so long as the state's interest overrides the law's impact on First Amendment rights," 7 0 the Chief
Justice found it beyond doubt that section 16A was constitutional.
Having argued that the statute could indeed withstand constitutional scrutiny, the Chief Justice responded to the majority's dismissal
of Massachusetts' interest in encouraging minors to report sex crimes.
While the state failed to present empirical evidence fortifying its contention that the statute encouraged victims to come forward, 17 1 the
Chief Justice argued that Massachusetts cannot be criticized for failing
to present such data. He reasoned that the state will only be able to
produce empirical evidence if it is allowed to experiment: "There is no
basis whatever
for this cavalier disregard of the reality of human
72
experience."
In addition, the Chief Justice challenged the Court's analysis regarding the lack of secrecy under section 16A. 17 3 He emphasized that
the statute was not implemented to protect confidentiality, but to prevent the risk of serious psychological damage that may result from testifying in front of a crowd. Moreover, in most states "that crowd may
be expanded to include a live television audience, with reruns on the
167. The Chief Justice maintained that "[t]he Commonwealth does not deny access to
information, and does nothing whatever to inhibit its disclosure. This case is quite unlike
others in which we have held unconstitutional state laws which prevent the dissemination of
information or the public discussion of ideas." Id.
168. Id at 616.
169. Id. But see Watson, supra note 58, at 900; Madsen, The Right to Attend Criminal
Proceedings,78 COLUM. L. REV. 1308, 1319 (1978).
170. 457 U.S. at 616. It is apparent that, unlike the Chief Justice, the majority did not
distinguish between the media's interest in disseminating information and its interest in actually being present at the proceedings. Indeed, the majority seemed to assert that § 16A
inhibits both interests "[w]here, as in the present case, the state attempts to deny the right of
access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the
denial is necessitated by compelling governmental interests." Id at 606-07. Although the
media's right of access is inhibited by § 16A, the statute does not prohibit disclosure of
sensitive information. Id
171. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
172. 457 U.S. at 617 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56.

660

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 11:637

evening news. That ordeal would be difficult for an adult; to 1a74child,
the experience can be devastating and leave permanent scars."
Finally, the Chief Justice determined that limiting the statute to a
case-by-case basis will lead to deleterious results. The victim may become seriously distressed before appearing in court, for absent statutory protection, he or she will not know whether public testimony will
be required. Further, this uncertainty may cause victims and their families to refrain from initially reporting the crime. The Chief Justice
argued that the state must be permitted to impose reasonable regulations reducing this unnecessary trauma: "It is within the power of the
state to provide for mandatory closure to alleviate such understandable
fears and encourage the reporting of such crimes." 1 75 In concluding,
the Chief Justice lamented that "[p]aradoxically, the Court today denies the victims the kind of protection routinely given to juveniles who
commit crimes."' 7 6
IV.

Application of Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court:

Refining the Rubric
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Gannett Co. expressly recognized that the right to a public trial applies exclusively to the defendant
under the Sixth Amendment. 77 That Justice Stewart's view was surrounded by disparate and ambiguous opinions ought not to diminish
the relevance of this recognition, for the Supreme Court has not yet
specifically repudiated this rationale. In Richmond Newspapers, the
Chief Justice's plurality opinion embraced the public's First Amendment right of access to public trials. 178 The Supreme Court thus recognized two independent constitutional rights relating to the open trial:
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right and the public's First Amendment right. Finally, in Globe Newspaper Co. the Supreme Court acknowledged the minor rape victim's interest in closed proceedings
while he or she testifies. Unlike the rights enjoyed by the defendant and
public, however, the victim's interest receives no constitutional support
and must be pondered by the trial court on a case-by-case basis. When
these First and Sixth Amendment rights and the victim's interest are at
odds,'7 9 the trial court is astricted to negotiate a perilous path.
174. 457 U.S. at 618 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also supra note 156.
175. 457 U.S. at 619 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 620.
177. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
179. Because the Massachusetts court determined that Globe Newspaper could not assert
the defendant's personal Sixth Amendment right, the Supreme Court had no occasion to
address the statute's effect on the Sixth Amendment. 457 U.S. at 601 n.8, 602 n.10.
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The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
in pertinent part, that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial in all criminal prosecutions. 8 ' This right to a public trial
"guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting police, prosecu' 8
tion and judicial process to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."' '
Justice Blackmun, in Gannett Co., emphasized the importance of this
right: "The public-trial concept embodied in the Sixth Amendment remains a fundamental and essential feature of our system of criminal
justice in both the federal courts and the state courts."' 8 2 In addition to
the public, the defendant is interested in the prevention of injustice that
may occur in a closed courtroom. When press and public are excluded
from the proceeding, only the transcript may be scrutinized. In State
ex re. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips,8 3 Justice Stern cautioned
that the transcript alone "is a sterile substitute for observing the actual
conduct of a hearing. . . . Actual observation of the demeanor, voice,
gestures of the participants in a hearing must be as informative to press
and public as those same matters are to juries during trial."'' 84 Even
where the transcript accurately reflects each participant's conduct in the
proceeding, the delay in revealing the information may undermine the
purpose of the public trial, since "[1later events
may crowd news of
' 85
yesterday's proceeding out of the public view."'
The underlying purpose of the First Amendment right of access to
criminal trials has roots similar to those of the Sixth Amendment: to
ensure informed discussion of governmental affairs and to preserve and
enhance the quality and integrity of the judicial process.'8 6 The assurance of public scrutiny, implicit in both the First and Sixth Amendments, is what ultimately challenges the victim's interest in closure.
Since the Supreme Court determined in Globe Newspaper Co. that
mandatory closure violates this concept of public scrutiny under the
First Amendment, the trial judge must successfully juggle-in light of
the circumstances surrounding each case-the defendant's and the public's right to an open trial, and the victim's interest in a closed proceeding. Failing to provide illuminative guidelines, the Supreme Court left
to the trial judges the arduous task of striking an acceptable balance in
each case.
180.

181.
182.
part).
183.
184.
185.
part).
186.

U.S. CONST. art. 6.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 414 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976).
Id at 471, 351 N.E.2d at 136 (Stem, J., concurring).
Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 442 n. 17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
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Although a case-by-case analysis turns on the facts of each situation, several guidelines uniformly applied may prove beneficial. In determining whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of the
minor victim, the Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper Co. suggested
that the trial judge consider the "victim's age, psychological maturity
and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim,
and the interests of parents and relatives."' 8 7 The most pertinent and
definitive factors are the nature of the crime and the desires of the victim and his or her family. If the minor is a victim of a sex offense and
is unable to recount the details in open court, or if the minor's family
prohibits such testimony, his or her age, psychological maturity, and
understanding become moot. Since the state's interest in safeguarding
the psychological well being of a minor "is a compelling one,"' 8 the
initial consideration should be twofold: whether the minor is a victim
of a sex offense and whether the victim is willing or able to testify in
open court. This prefatory inquiry eliminates Justice Brennan's concern that a victim would automatically be precluded from testifying in
public;1 89 as a result of this inquiry a victim may recount the details of
the crime in front of press and public if he or she so chooses. If the
victim is unable to testify in an open trial, the trial judge should conduct a preclosure hearing.
In the preclosure hearing, representatives of the press and public
must be provided with the opportunity to express their views relating to
their exclusion. 90 Of course, the defendant must also be heard. The
trial court, however, must protect the victim "by denying these representatives the opportunity to confront or cross-examine the victim, or
by denying them access to sensitive details concerning the victim and
the victim's future testimony."' 9' After hearing from the defendant,
press, and public, the trial court must exercise its powers of closure only
when it is necessary to permit the witness to testify accurately and entirely. The victim should not, however, be subjected to a trial-within-atrial in which his or her susceptibility to trauma would be appraised.
Rather, the judge need only determine that the victim's aversion to testifying in an open proceeding is genuine. Although the court's determination is discretionary, the threshold dictating closure should be
187. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 608.
188. Id.at 607. Creating an environment that enables the victim to testify about the
crime comports, arguably, with the concept of "safeguarding the psychological well-being of
a minor." Id
189. Id.at 608-09.
190. Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 401 (Powell, J., concurring).
191, Globe Newvspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 609 n.25. The state's interest in safeguarding the
welfare of the minor victim would be defeated without such trial court discretion. Id
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determined by the victim's sincerity.' 92 The court, however, must carefully limit the duration of the closure to that period when the testifying
victim requires protection.
Where the victim's apprehension is apparent, yet the defendant's
or press' concern is, in the trial judge's discretion, particularly compel94
ling,193 the judge should arrange to videotape the victim's testimony.'
Before such an arrangement is made, however, the judge must first find
that he or she is unable to strike an acceptable balance among the competing rights and interests. If the judge determines that it is necessary
to videotape, he or she should preside at the proceeding. In addition,
the defendant and his or her attorney may be present in order to protect the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the victim. This videotape should be admissible as evidence in
the trial. The victim will be spared the trauma of testifying in an open
proceeding, while press and public will be able to observe the demeanor, voice, and gestures of the participants shortly after the testimony is given. The victim's interest is thus protected. If the victim has
a genuine aversion to testifying, he or she may be compelled, in exceptional circumstances, to testify on videotape-an experience which arguably is less traumatic than testifying in front of press and public.
The defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and the press' First
Amendment rights are accommodated as well. Each decision permitting closure is discretionary and must be granted by the trial judge on a
case-by-case basis. Moreover, closure is only applicable to the limited
period during which the victim discloses the details of the crime. Both
defendant and press are provided the opportunity to participate in the
preclosure hearing, and if the court decides that the victim's testimony
should be videotaped, the defendant can cross-examine the victim during the videotape session. Finally, the press may be entitled to view the
victim's videotape in a timely manner when particular circumstances so
warrant.
192. The Supreme Court stated that "[i]n individual cases, and under appropriate circumstances the First Amendment does not necessarily stand as a bar to the exclusion from
the courtroom of the press and general public during the testimony of minor sex-offense
victims." Id. at 611 n.27. The victim's expression of aversion should be viewed as an "appropriate circumstance."
193. Such exigent concerns must be important to the controversy viewed in a societal
context; the particular facts underlying the case, the uniqueness of the situation, and the
nature of the publicity are pertinent factors to be considered.
194. For a related view that does not address the use of videotape in the context of the
suggested twofold inquiry, see Comment, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 11 HoFSTRA L. REv. 1353, 1375-76 (1983).
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Conclusion
The controversy in Globe Newspaper Co. centered on a Massachusetts statute compelling the mandatory closure of the courtroom while a
minor rape victim testifies. Championing the rights of child rape victims, the state twice argued successfully before the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, and once unsuccessfully before the United
States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court produced its decision only
after weaving the concepts of mandatory closure and ad hoc determinations into a web of competing constitutional and historical concerns.
Entwined in this web, and elemental to the Supreme Court's conclusion, were the interests recognized in Gannett Co. and Richmond
Newspapers.
The decision ultimately posited in Globe Newspaper Co. does not
represent an established hierarchy of interests; rather, it is the product
of equivocal views. The Supreme Court Justices, divided by the dissonant nature of the competing constitutional interests, were unable to
rally behind any one definitive opinion in either Gannett Co. or Richmond Newspapers. Although the Supreme Court displayed a greater
unity in Globe Newspaper Co., it failed to suggest illuminating guidelines for balancing Sixth Amendment and First Amendment rights
with the state's interest in protecting minor victims of sex crimes.

